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We report on our preliminary findings from an innovative module of survey questions in 
the RAND American Life Panel designed to measure willingness to delay take-up of 
Social Security benefits. Among respondents who expect to stop working full time prior 
to turning age 62, over 60 percent report that they expect to start claiming Social Security 
benefits after they turn 63—that is, they expect to delay claiming. In contrast, among 
those who expect to stop full-time work sometime from age 62 to age 70, only about one-
quarter expect to delay claiming beyond the retirement age. Another main finding arises 
from reported probabilities of delayed claiming in hypothetical choice scenarios. These 
probabilities tend to be quite high relative to previous findings on delayed claiming 
outcomes. This result is particularly striking for those who are presented with information 
about the so-called “break-even age” for delayed claiming rather than information about 
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   Annuitization of wealth confers many potential benefits to older Americans. According to 
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and other sources, however, the rate of 
voluntary annuitization is quite low in the United States. Of particular concern to policymakers is 
the risk of low levels of household income and wealth and, hence, consumption at advanced 
ages.   This issue is being confronted in many other countries as well, where policies are in place 
or under consideration to mandate at least partial annuitization of defined contribution pensions 
(Brown, 2001; Lunnon, 2002). 
The choice of initial claiming age for Social Security retirement benefits is analogous to 
the decision to purchase annuities (Coile et al., 2002).  Currently, someone who stops working at 
age 62 has the option of either taking up Social Security benefits immediately or delaying 
claiming.  If the retiree claims immediately, the monthly benefit is 75% of the “primary 
insurance amount” (PIA) calculated by the Social Security Administration (SSA). If the retiree 
instead delays claiming for one year, the monthly Social Security benefit will be 80% of the PIA. 
Thus, this one-year delay currently involves the implicit purchase of almost seven percent 
(.80/.75) more in Social Security annuities by the expenditure of one year of Social Security 
benefits. Under existing rules, the return to this one-year delay will gradually increase beginning 
in 2017, to just over 7% (.75/.70) in 2022 and beyond.  
Prior to changes in the “early retirement reduction” that began in 2000, the return to the 
one-year delay from 62 to 63 exceeded 8% (.867/.80), which Coile et al. (2002) found to be 
approximately actuarially fair for a single male based on population life tables and a real interest 
rate of 3%. As such, these implicit annuity purchases are found to be attractively priced relative 
to private annuities (Brown and Warshawsky, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1999). The implicit annuity 
purchases should be particularly appealing to risk averse individuals who perceive relatively high 
probabilities of survival to advanced old age.
1 Coile et al. (2002) use simulation evidence on 
optimal timing of benefit take-up to identify attributes of individuals who should find these 
annuities particularly appealing. For instance, they find that a married retiree garners greater 
                                                 
1 Duggan and Soares (2002) review the legislative history of changes in the “normal retirement age” (NRA), “early 
retirement reduction”, and “delayed retirement credit”, and assess gender differences in actuarial equivalence of the 
reductions and credits. In an assessment of the early retirement reduction prior to changes based on 1983 
amendments to the Social Security Act, they argue, “For benefit claims prior to the NRA, Congress originally 
intended that benefit adjustments would be actuarially equivalent on average”. Duggan and Soares find an “actuarial 
premium for males, particularly low-earnings males, who accept benefits early and an actuarial loss for most 
females who accept benefits early”. Thus, the implicit annuity purchases may only be attractively priced for some 
demographic groups.    
 2  
returns to delayed claiming than a single retiree, especially if the spouse is younger. The 
relationship between the optimal delay and household wealth is found to be either increasing or 
“U-shaped” and sensitive to the bequest motive. Of course, those with lower mortality risk and 
lower discount rates will find the annuities more attractive, all else equal.  
Coile et al. find that the empirical pattern of variation in delayed claiming probabilities is 
generally consistent with predicted variation with these attributes, but the overall rate of delayed 
claiming is very low in their analysis of data from the New Beneficiary Data System. For 
example, among men who retired before reaching age 62, less than 10% delayed claiming until 
age 63 or later. Hurd et al. (2004) calculate similar claiming rates based on HRS data and find 
that theoretical predictors of delayed claiming, including direct measures of subjective mortality 
risk, have little predictive value. 
  Even if the current Social Security program undergoes a major overhaul, policymakers 
still face important, if not more important, questions about how to encourage annuitization of 
wealth. President Bush’s reform proposal called for personal retirement accounts that “would not 
be accessible prior to retirement” and would be “paid out over time” via “some combination of 
annuities to ensure a stream of monthly income over the worker’s life expectancy, phased 
withdrawals indexed to life expectancy, and lump sum withdrawals.”
2 Lump sum withdrawals 
would not be permitted “if doing so would result in their moving below the poverty line.” Thus, 
the question of when to initiate access to a personal retirement account and which payout options 
to choose would, for many low-income households, closely resemble the current decision to take 
up Social Security benefits. 
What do current workers know about the returns to delayed claiming? To answer this 
question, one may start by looking to the personalized Social Security Statement sent annually to 
workers who are age 25 and older and not receiving Social Security benefits. For a worker born 
after 1960 who has earned enough credits to qualify for benefits, the Statement reports estimated 
retirement benefits at three different ages, as follows: 
At your current earnings rate, if you stop working and start receiving benefits… 
At age 62, your payment would be about …………………………........... $(0.70PIA) a month 
If you continue working until… 
                                                 
2 The reform proposal, dated February 2005 and entitled Strengthening Social Security in the 21
st Century, is 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/200501/socialsecurity.pdf. The cited text is taken 
from pages 7 and 8.  
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    your full retirement age (67 years), your payment would be about….... $(1.00PIA) a month 
    age 70, your payment would be about……..…………………............... $(1.24PIA) a month 
We note two important elements of this information. First, the return to any one year deviation in 
claiming age is not presented. Second, for each conditional expectation, the claiming age is 
assumed to coincide with the age at which the individual stops working. Thus, the estimated 
change in benefits may arise in part from a change in the PIA rather than just a change in the 
reduction/credit multiplier that, for this worker, ranges from 0.70 to 1.24. 
Current workers may look to the SSA website for additional estimates of their future 
retirement benefits. The website offers three “Benefit Calculators”
3 that vary in the extent of 
information required to be entered by the individual, ranging from the “Quick Calculator” that 
requires just the date of birth and current earnings to the “Online Calculator” that requires 
estimates of the entire earnings history to the “Detailed Calculator” application that must be 
downloaded.  
Information describing the benefit rules is available throughout the website. In addition to 
detailed information on the reduction/credit multiplier rules, the page entitled “Early or Late 
Retirement”
4 reports the percentage of the PIA associated with the desired retirement age entered 
by the individual. A page entitled “Break-Even Age”
5 allows the individual to report estimated 
monthly benefits conditional on a self-selected “earlier retirement age” and “later retirement 
age.” This page refers the reader to his or her Social Security Statement for benefit estimates. 
After retirement ages and benefit estimates are entered, the individual is informed:  
Your estimated break-even age is XX. 
If you expect to live beyond this age, it would be to your advantage to delay your 
retirement.  
Note: interest is not considered in the calculation. 
This language suggests that, as in the Statement, the benefit claiming age coincides with 
retirement age.
6 We also note that this break-even age calculation ignores not only interest but 
also the insurance component of this annuity. 
                                                 
3 Available at http://www.ssa.gov/planners/calculators.htm. 
4 Available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/early_late.html#calculator. 
5 Available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/when2retire.html. 
6 This relationship holds tautologically if one defines “retirement” as the time of retirement benefit take-up, but we 
argue that workers are more likely to define retirement in terms of labor force participation behavior.  
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In this paper, we present preliminary findings from our effort to dig deeper into what 
workers know about the returns to delayed claiming and how benefit rules impact retirement 
behavior. We designed a module of survey questions that elicits from future beneficiaries their 
expectations of retirement and claiming behavior and of the returns to delayed claiming. The 
module is being administered to members of American Life Panel (ALP), an ongoing panel 
study in which surveys are conducted via the Internet. We report here on data from 299 ALP 
members under age 60 who had completed the interview as of mid-September 2007, reported 
that they are not currently receiving Social Security benefits, and reported a positive probability 
of receiving benefits at some time in the future. 
Our main findings arise from different pieces of evidence on expectations of delayed 
claiming and of the returns to delayed claiming. First, among respondents who expect to stop 
working full time prior to turning age 62, over 60 percent report that they expect to start claiming 
Social Security benefits after they turn 63—that is, they expect to delay claiming. In contrast, 
among those who expect to stop full-time work sometime from age 62 to age 70, only about one-
quarter expect to delay claiming beyond the retirement age. Second, reported probabilities of 
delayed claiming in hypothetical choices scenarios tend to be quite high relative to previous 
findings on delayed claiming outcomes. This result is particularly striking for those who are 
presented with information about the break-even age rather than information about the total 
amount of benefits that must be foregone during the one year delay.  
The high reported probabilities of delayed claiming may be attributed to our specification 
of benefit streams that exhibit returns that tend to be high relative to those that respondents 
expect to actually face at retirement. Many respondents expect little or no increase in benefits 
arising from delayed claiming and report that benefits will likely be cut substantially at some 
point after taking them up. In contrast, the scenarios specify that delayed claiming will increase 
benefits by more than 8 percent and these benefits will be guaranteed to keep up with inflation 
for the remainder of the individual’s lifetime. 
Alternatively, one may argue that the high reported probabilities of delayed claiming 
point to weaknesses inherent in any hypothetical choice experiment concerning a decision that 
may be many years ahead. If individuals actually believe they will be more patient than empirical 
evidence suggests they will—e.g., if choice behavior is consistent with hyperbolic discounting—
then it important to gather evidence on the magnitude of the inconsistency between expectations  
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and behaviors and on its impact on behavior over the life cycle. If it is the case that individuals 
planning for retirement expect to use the break-even age decision rule to choose claiming age but 
they ultimately base decisions on the importance of the immediate loss of one year of benefits, 
then the findings in this analysis will be helpful for predicting future deviations of expectations 
from behavior and the consequences thereof. For a recent example of the usefulness of stated 
preference data on a related decision—choices between defined benefit and defined contribution 
pensions—see van Rooij et al. (2007). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes key survey questions we have 
designed to measure expectations of the returns to delayed claiming and choice behavior. Section 
2 describes the ALP data collected thus far. The empirical findings are presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. Measuring Expectations of Delayed Claiming Returns and Choices 
 
Unlike previous studies of the decision to delay receipt of Social Security benefits, our 
work is based on survey questions in which we directly elicit respondent willingness to delay via 
hypothetical choice questions under alternative scenarios of the returns to delayed claiming and 
descriptions thereof. We wish to do so in the context of a plausible retirement scenario, in terms 
of both future labor force participation and potential ages of benefit claiming. On the former, we 
ask the respondent to describe his or her retirement plans and then condition benefit claiming 
choices on these plans. Rather than choose a single reference age from which the respondent 
might delay—e.g., either 62 or the NRA—we elicit the respondent’s expected age of claiming 
and then elicit the probability of delaying by one year conditional on the respondent’s retirement 
plans and our description of the returns to claiming. To assess how our hypothetical scenario 
compares to respondent beliefs, we also elicit expectations of Social Security benefits. We 
describe key elements of the survey module below. The full text of the module is included in 
Appendix A. 
 
Eliciting Information on Which to Condition Hypothetical Choices  
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To begin the survey module, respondents are asked to report their labor force 
participation plans as follows: 
We are interested in your plans for work and retirement when you are in your 60’s and 
beyond. Which of the following statements best describes your plans? 
1.  I will not be working full time at age 60 or later. 
2.  I will be working full time at age 60 or later, but I will completely stop working 
sometime after age 60. 
3.  I will be working full time at age 60 or later, but I will stop working full time 
sometime after age 60 and will likely continue working part time.  
4.  I will work full time for as long as I can, throughout my 60’s and beyond. 
Respondents who report that they will stop working full time are asked for the age at which they 
expect to stop working full time. We refer to this age as the expected retirement age tR*. 
The Social Security expectations questions begin with one that elicits the percent chance 
of receiving benefits in the future. Only those who report a positive chance are asked the 
subsequent questions. We allow that respondents may expect to retire and begin claiming Social 
Security benefits at different ages—e.g., they may expect to delay claiming. We therefore ask 
them to report the age at which they expect to begin claiming Social Security benefits. This age 
is labeled tC*.
7  We then ask respondents to report expected Social Security benefits at age tC*, 
conditional on retirement plans, including expected retirement age, as follows: 
Suppose you [never work full time/ stop working full time at age tR* / work full time for 
as long as you can, throughout your 60’s and beyond,] and start collecting Social Security 
benefits at age tC*, about how much would you expect the payments to be in today’s 
dollars. 




Measuring willingness to delay claiming 
To assess willingness to delay claiming, we construct hypothetical choice scenarios based 
on preceding responses and elicit probabilistic choice expectations for various values of the 
                                                 
7 This question and all subsequent questions in this module are skipped if the respondent does not report a positive 
probability of receiving Social Security benefits at some time in the future. 
8 Here and below, the choice among the alternative texts given in brackets is determined by preceding responses. 
Underlined phrases are linked to a definition screen.  
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return to delayed claiming. In particular, prior to being asked the central question of interest—
that is, “What do you think is the percent chance that you would choose to wait one year to start 
collecting benefits at age tC*+1?”—respondents are presented with the following scenario: 
Suppose you [never work full time/ stop working full time at age tR* / work full time for 
as long as you can, throughout your 60’s and beyond], and you have not yet begun to 
collect Social Security benefits as you are about to turn age tC*. 
 
Suppose you must choose between starting to collect your benefits when you turn age tC* 
or when you turn age tC* +1. 
 
If you choose to start to collect benefits at age tC*, then you will receive $b per month, 
and this amount will be guaranteed to increase annually based on a “cost-of-living 
adjustment” in order to keep up with inflation for the remainder of your lifetime. 
 
If instead you choose to wait one year to start collecting benefits at age tC*+1, then you 
will be guaranteed to receive an additional $r1b each month [—that is, an extra $r1b 12 
each year—] in today’s dollars. This amount will be increased annually based on a “cost-
of-living adjustment” in order to keep up with inflation for the remainder of your 
lifetime. 
We must choose a hypothetical monthly benefit b at age tC*. We choose b equal to 1200, 1800 or 
2400, with the specific value depending on the respondent’s answer to the previous question 
eliciting expected monthly benefits at age tC*.
9 The return to delayed take-up of Social Security 
benefits in the first choice scenario r1 equals 1/12. This value was chosen to approximate the 
reduction/credit multipliers in current benefit rules while yielding a reasonably rounded dollar 
value—$100, $150, or $200. Respondents report up to four choice probabilities for increasing 
values of the return r = 1/12, 1/8, 1/6, and 5/24, respectively. 
  After describing this scenario, but still before eliciting the chance of delayed claiming, 
we present respondents with one of four information treatments, randomly assigned with equal 
probability. In the first treatment, respondents receive the same information about break-even 
age for delaying receipt of benefits that the SSA currently provides online:  
                                                 
9 The thresholds for the question-branching algorithm are $1500 and $2100. Those with higher expected benefits are 
given higher hypothetical values b.  
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If you expect to live beyond age tC*+(1/r), then it would be to your advantage to delay 
your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this calculation).
10  
In contrast, the second treatment explicitly informs respondents of the amount of money they 
would forgo by delaying claiming and the number of years it would take to make up that amount 
in nominal terms. 
By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits (that is, b 12 dollars) while 
you are age tC*, but you would make up that amount in 1/r years. 
  The last two information treatments replicate the first two treatments, but for the addition 
of text that calls attention to the insurance component of an annuity. In particular, the third 
(fourth) treatment adds the following sentence to text of the first (second) treatment.  
Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra rb 12 per year in the event that you 
live for many years after that. 
 
Measuring Social Security Benefit Expectations 
  To assess the relative attractiveness of the hypothetical returns to delayed claiming, we 
must know something about the respondent’s expected returns. We focus on three key 
components of these expectations: the increase in benefits at the claiming age, changes in real 
benefits after initial receipt, and the work record on which benefits will be based. 
  A point expectation of expected benefits at age tC* is elicited as described above. Similar 
text is used to elicit expected benefits conditional on delayed claiming until age tC*+1. The 
difference between these two point expectations provides a convenient summary statistic for the 
expected returns to delayed claiming. However, expectations of real benefit reductions 
subsequent to take-up may reduce the perceived attractiveness of delayed claiming. We assess 
these beliefs by asking the following two questions: 
Suppose you were to start collecting Social Security benefits at about age tC* or 
tC*+1, what do you think is the percent chance that your benefits would keep up 
with inflation for the remainder of your lifetime? That is, what do you think is the 
percent chance that your Social Security benefits would increase at least as fast as 
the cost of living for the reminder of your lifetime? 
and 
                                                 
10 Here and below, ages and years are rounded up when r=5/24.   
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Suppose you were to start collecting Social Security benefits at about age tC*+1 
or tC*+1, what do you think is the percent chance that your benefits would be cut 
substantially at some point after you start collecting them? 
Respondents who report relatively high probabilities of real benefit reductions may find the 
hypothetical choice scenarios more attractive, given that all benefits are said to be “guaranteed to 
increase annually based on a ‘cost-of-living adjustment’ in order to keep up with inflation for the 
remainder of your lifetime”. 
  Finally, we note that the actual returns to delayed claiming currently depend on marital 
status and the work record on which benefits are based. To clarify the situation facing each 
respondent, we ask whether benefits are expected to be received “based on your own work 
record only; from a current, previous, or late spouse’s work record only; or from both”. 
 
 
2. American Life Panel Data 
 
This survey instrument was included as a module in the RAND American Life Panel 
(ALP). The ALP is an Internet panel of over 1000 respondents age 18 and over, recruited from 
among individuals age 18 and older who respond to the monthly Survey of Consumers 
conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center.
11 Respondents in the panel 
either use their own computer to log on to the Internet or use a Web TV, which allows them to 
access the Internet using their television and a telephone line. The Web TV technology allows 
respondents who did not have previous Internet access to participate in the panel.  
  For this survey module on Social Security claiming, we restrict the sample to respondents 
who are younger than 60 years of age, do not currently receive any income from Social Security 
payments, and perceive a positive probability of receiving Social Security benefits in the future. 
As of mid-September, we have 299 observations in the sample that satisfy these restrictions. 
  In addition to responses to the Social Security claiming module, we have additional data 
on the background characteristics, preferences, and expectations of respondents. The attribute 
data include age, gender, marital status, education, and current labor force status. Respondents 
                                                 
11 Prior to December 2006, respondents were required to be at least 40 years of age at the time of the Michigan 
survey interview.  
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who are currently employed or have been employed in the previous two years are asked whether 
they are included in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, and this plan is identified as either a 
defined benefit or defined contribution plan or a mixture of the two. An advantage of using the 
ALP is that much additional information on the respondents is available from earlier interviews 
other than the attribute data include in the release of data from the present interview. In this 
preliminary analysis, however, we restrict attention to data reported in the release from these 
interviews. 
  Early on in the questionnaire, well before the Social Security claiming module, we pose 
several questions eliciting expectations and stated preferences that should be related to the 
decision to delay claiming.  In particular, respondents report survival probabilities in the same 
form as those contained in the HRS data studied by Hurd et al. (2004). Here, the expectations 
concern the probability of living to age 70 and the probability of living to age 80. Lastly, we use 
two separate series of hypothetical choice questions to elicit time preferences. Respondents are 
first asked to choose between a payment of $100 “today” and a payment of $(1+)100 “one year 
from now”. We increase  from 0.00 to 0.25 until the respondent chooses the delayed payment, 
so that we may characterize respondents according to the lowest value of  at which they will 
delay payment. We also ask a parallel series of question where the choice is between $100 “10 
years from now” or $(1+)100 “11 years from now”. According to standard theory, the choice of 
a consumer who discounts exponentially will be invariant to the specified time horizons, whereas 
a hyperbolic discounter will be more likely to delay in the latter series of questions for any give 
value of  (Laibson, 1997). To the extent that responses vary across time horizons, it is of 
interest to determine which is more predictive of stated preferences for delayed claiming that 
could take place no sooner than three years hence for respondents under age 60. 
  The entries in Table 1 describe the 299 ALP respondents, who range in age from 18 to 
59, with mean 47.6 and median 50.
12 The sample is clearly not representative of the US adult 
population.
13 Most respondents are male (62%), a large majority are currently employed (81%), 
and half report having earned a bachelor’s degree.  
                                                 
12 The great majority (85%) of the respondents fall in the range 40 to 59 as a result of the age-40+ sampling 
restriction in place through 2006 (see previous footnote) and the less-than-60 restriction in place for this module. 
13 This statement holds if one compares respondents age 40 and over to the US population over age 40. Post-survey 
adjustment weights will be available in a future release of the data.  
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  All respondents answered the time preference and survival probability questions. Over 
one-third of respondents (37%) always preferred to receive $100 today rather than delay for one 
year, whereas 31% of respondents did so when choosing between 10 and 11 years hence. Taken 
together, 19% of respondents require a higher payment to delay one year from today relative to 
one year from 10 years hence. 
  Respondents are pretty evenly divided among the four retirement plans, but for the plan 
to work full time until at least age 60 and then completely stop working, which garners just 14%. 
Among those who report an age at which they expect to stop working full time, the median is 62 
with a range from 30 to 75.  
  The reported percent chance of receiving Social Security benefits in the future averages 
70.6 percent, with a range from 1 to 100.
14 More than two-thirds expect to receive these benefits 
based only on their own work records and just 2 percent expect to do so based only on a spouse’s 
record. The reports of the expected age of claiming average 66 with a median of 65 and a range 
from 55 to 95. All but 26 of the reported ages fall in the range from 62 to 70 that should contain 
all reports if respondents are fully informed about current rules and fully anticipate that the rules 
will not change.
15 Expected monthly benefits at the expected claiming age tC* average $1263 
with a median of $1200 and a range from $50 to $4238. Expectations for claiming one year later 
at  tC*+1 average $1342 with a median of $1200 and a range from $50 to $4500. Most 
respondents report a low percent chance that benefits will keep up with inflation after take-up 
(median=25, mean=29.8) and most perceive at least a 50-50 chance that benefits will actually be 
cut substantially (median=50, mean=44.8). 
  The reported beliefs on future benefits indicate that, for many respondents, the delayed 
claiming scenarios we pose are very attractive relative to expected Social Security benefits and 
the expected returns to delayed claiming. For instance, the median expected benefit level 
conditional on claming at age tC*+1, $1200, falls short of the lowest value posed in the 
scenarios, $1300.
16 Moreover, the benefits and returns to delayed claiming posed in the scenarios 
are “guaranteed” and “ keep up with inflation for the remainder of your lifetime”. It is perhaps 
not surprising then that the perceived probabilities of delayed claiming are high relative to 
                                                 
14 In addition, twelve respondents reported a 0 percent chance and were therefore excluded from this sample. 
15 It is also important that respondents do not consider such benefits as disability or survivor benefits for which 
eligibility may precede age 62. 
16 The median at tC*, $1200, equals the lowest values in the scenarios.  
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observed outcomes in historical data. As reported in Table 1, the mean reported chance of 
delaying claiming in the first scenario, with an 8.33% increase in monthly benefits—e.g., $1300 
versus $1200—is a 57.9 percent chance, with a median of 60, a standard deviation of 32.7 and a 
range from 0 to 100. The mean increases to 69.1 with a 12.5% increase in benefits, 75.4 with a 
16.67% increase, and 79.3 with a 20.83% increase. In each case the percent chance ranges from 
0 to 100, indicating that some respondents are unwilling to delay claiming even for very high 
returns. Most respondents, however, report a very high chance of delayed claiming in the most 
generous scenario, as demonstrated by the median of a 90 percent chance. 
  Table 2 describes the delayed claiming expectations for important subsets of respondents. 
The variation across information treatments is quite striking. Consider the first scenario. Among 
respondents given treatment 1—“If you expect to live beyond age tC*+12, then it would be to 
your advantage to delay your retirement”—the mean percent chance is 72.1, whereas the mean is 
just 41.9 among respondents given treatment 2—“By choosing to wait, you would give up one 
year of benefits (that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 12 years”. Thus, calling attention to the immediate benefits foregone seems to lead to 
reports of delayed claiming probabilities that are much closer to what has been previously 
observed. Qualitatively similar differences persist for the subsequent scenarios with higher 
returns to delayed claiming, as well as when treatment 3 respondents are pooled together with 
treatment 1 and treatment 4 respondents are pooled with treatment 2. The additional information 
presented in treatments 3 and 4—“Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/r)b 12 
per year in the event that you live for many years after that”—is associated with lower 
expectations of delayed claiming in one case (3 versus 1) and higher expectations in the other (4 
versus 2). 
  The entries in Table 2 also describe reports given by the sample of respondents who 
expect not to work full time after age 62 and expect to receive Social Security benefits based on 
their own records only. This group of ALP respondents more closely resembles, on expectation 
(loosely defined), a population that has been of interest in previous analyses because the 
behavioral predictions are clearer for them than for the broader population of all potential 
beneficiaries. Our small existing sample of 70 respondents gives reports that vary similarly 
across treatments but tend to be lower in each case relative to reports given by the 228 other  
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respondents to at least of the hypothetical choice questions. We use the broader sample of 
respondents in the remainder of our analysis. 
 
 
3. Expectations of Delayed Claiming Returns and Choices 
 
  Our survey module contains two main pieces of evidence on expectations of delayed 
claiming. Respondents report the expected age of stopping full-time work tR*, if applicable, and 
then they report the expected age of take-up of benefits tC*. If tC* is greater than the maximum of 
tR* and 62, then we say that the respondent “expects to delay claiming”. The second piece of 
evidence comes from the reported probability of choosing to claim at tC*+1 rather than at tC*. 
  Table 3 presents findings from the former piece of evidence. Among the 202 respondents 
who report that they plan to stop working full-time before they turn 71, 82 expect to do so before 
age 62, 32 expect to do so at age 62, 44 expect to do so at age 65, and the remaining 44 report 
values for tR* in the interval from 63 to 70 other than 65. Among those with tR* less than 62, 
only 34% report tC*=62, whereas 61% expect to delay claiming beyond 62.
17 In contrast, among 
those for whom tR* takes a value from 62 to 70, 72% report tC*=tR* and only 26% expect to 
delay claiming. The latter percentages are much closer to what has been observed in the past. 
However, it may very well be that early retirees will be more likely to delaying claiming in the 
future than has been previously observed.
18 After all, benefits claimed at age 62 will be a 
markedly lower fraction of PIA than in the past—a value in the interval [.70,.75] as opposed to 
.80. The wealth holdings and demographic composition of early retirees will likely be rather 
different than previously observed, for this reason among others. 
  The evidence presented on choice probabilities in Table 2 is indicative of respondents 
who tend to be willing to delay claiming beyond the currently expected age tC*. Reconciling 
these findings with the Table 3 evidence on expected retirement and claiming ages requires that 
                                                 
17 In addition, 1 respondent reports an expected claiming age of 55 and 3 report an expected claiming age of 60. 
18 It should be noted that respondents may expect the initial age of eligibility to exceed 62 and, therefore, a reported 
claiming age of tC*>62 may not actually indicate an expectation of delay. 
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we understand how the returns to delayed claiming posed in the hypothetical choice scenarios 
compare to what respondents expect them to be when the actual choice will be faced.
19 
  One important dimension of the returns to delayed claiming is the expected change in 
monthly benefits arising from the delay. Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the reported monthly 
benefit based on claiming at tC* and the difference in expected monthly benefits based on 
claiming in tC*+1 as opposed to tC*. A sizeable fraction (34%) reports no difference in benefits 
based on a one year delay, while 61.4% report a higher benefit for delayed claiming. The 
nominal difference tends to increase with expected benefits at tC*. Overall, the mean difference 
is $75.40 and the median is $50. When expressed as a percentage of expected benefits at tC*, the 
mean difference is 6.45% and the median is 3.85% The difference posed in the hypothetical 
scenarios ranges from 8.33%—$100, $150, or $200—in the first scenario to 20.83% in the final 
scenario. 
  We conclude the analysis with estimation of best linear predictors (BLPs) of delayed 
claiming. The first column of Table 4 presents least squares estimates of the BLP of the percent 
chance of delayed claiming in the first hypothetical choice scenario, where benefits are increased 
by 8.33% for a one-year delay. 
  First, consider some predictor variables that are directly related to a respondent’s beliefs 
about the returns to delayed claiming of Social Security benefits: the expected change in initial 
benefits if claiming is delayed for one year, the belief that benefits will keep up with inflation 
after take-up, and the belief that benefits will be cut substantially after take-up. The hypothetical 
choice scenarios elicit the chance of delaying one year past the age when the respondent expects 
to actually claim benefits tC*. Therefore, we expect that more positive assessments of actual 
future returns will be negatively related to the chance of delayed claiming in the hypothetical 
scenarios. To understand this prediction, consider a respondent for whom the expected return is 
worse than the hypothetical return as compared to a respondent for whom the expected return is 
better. The former respondent should be more likely to hypothetically delay claiming past tC* 
than should the latter respondent, all else equal. 
  We expect the coefficient on the percent chance that benefits will be cut substantially to 
be positive, because the posed scenario is better than what the respondent expects. We estimate a 
                                                 
19 It is also important to note that the claiming delay described in Table 3 refers to the deviation of tC* from 
max{tR*,62}, whereas the hypothetical claiming delay refers to a deviation from tC*.  
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coefficient of 0.135, with an estimated standard error of 0.077. Following the same line of 
reasoning, we expect negative coefficients on the percent chance that benefits will keep up with 
inflation and on the expected change in benefits associated with a one-year delay. Instead, both 
coefficients are estimated to be negative, but they are imprecisely estimated. 
  The subjective survival probability is another expectations variable for which we have a 
clear theoretical prediction for its relationship to delayed claiming. Those with lower mortality 
risk, as measured here by higher subjective probability of living to age 80, should be more likely 
to delay claiming. In fact, we find that the BLP of the percent chance of delay increases by 0.252 
for every 1 percentage point increase in the chance of living to 80. 
  Now consider the variables capturing future time preferences. We construct dummy 
variables based on the minimum return that the respondent requires in order to delay payment 
from 10 years to 11 years. The omitted category is those who require a minimum return of 
greater than 25% in order to delay payment—i.e., those who never choose to delay payment in 
the hypothetical choice questions we pose. The estimate coefficients are all positive, indicating 
that those who discount the future less than members of the omitted group are more likely to 
delay claiming. The point estimates, however, are not monotonically declining with minimum 
required payment.  
  Lastly, we note that the estimated BLP varies with the information treatment variables in 
the same way that was described in Table 2. Of course, treatment assignment was designed to be 
independent of the other predictor variables, so this finding is not at all surprising. Respondents 
are most willing to delay claiming in Treatment 1 (the omitted category) in response to the 
break-even age information. 
  The second column of Table 4 presents analogous estimates where the outcome variable 
is instead an indicator for delayed claiming determined by whether the expected claiming age 
exceeds both the expected retirement age and what is now the earliest claiming age, 62.  We 
restrict the sample to those 185 respondents who report an expected retirement age of less than 
70, currently the highest claiming age with an actuarial adjustment, and who report values for all 
of the predictor variables. For sake of comparison, the best linear predictor of the chance of 
delayed claiming in the first scenario is also estimated using this restricted sample, with results 
reported in the third column.  
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  Consider again the predictor variables describing the expected returned to delayed 
claiming. Unlike the previous case, we expect that higher expected returns from a one year delay 
will be positively associated with this delayed claiming indicator. After all, it should be these 
expected returns or, more precisely, the expected returns to the preceding one year delay, that 
induce responses to expect to delay in the first place. In contrast, those who expect to 
immediately claim benefits upon retirement may be doing so precisely because they expect low 
returns. The estimated coefficient, while relatively small and imprecisely estimated, supports this 
argument. 
  In stark contrast to the comparable finding from the hypothetical choice response, the 
estimated coefficient on survival probability is unsupportive of the basic prediction on mortality 
risk and delayed claiming. The estimated coefficients on the time preference indicators, however, 
are relatively precisely estimated, are of the predicted sign, and are monotonically decreasing as 
predicted. Finally, as one would hope given the experimental design, the coefficients on the 






We report on our findings from an innovative module of survey questions designed to 
measure willingness to delay take-up of Social Security benefits. We find that, among 
respondents who expect to stop working full time prior to turning age 62, over 60 percent report 
that they expect to start claiming Social Security benefits after they turn 63—that is, they expect 
to delay claiming. In contrast, among those who expect to stop full-time work sometime from 
age 62 to age 70, only about one-quarter expect to delay claiming beyond the retirement age. 
Another main component of the analysis focuses on reported probabilities of delayed claiming in 
hypothetical choices scenarios. These probabilities tend to be quite high relative to previous 
findings on delayed claiming outcomes. This result is particularly striking for those who are 
presented with information about the break-even age for delayed claiming rather than 
information about the total amount of benefits that must be foregone during the one year delay.   
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Our findings are still preliminary. The data collection for this survey module is ongoing. 
The increase in sample size will allow us to reach more definitive conclusions, especially with 
respect to the multivariate analysis. A larger sample size will also allow for estimation of 
structural models of the decision to delay claiming. Additionally, future work will utilize data 
from previous waves of the ALP that should be very helpful for this analysis, including data on 
household wealth and on measures of financial literacy based on responses to a questionnaire 
adapted from that analyzed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2005). We also intend to conduct a 
supplemental analysis using data from the HRS to study how reported expectations of claiming 
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Appendix A – American Life Panel Survey Questions 
 
1. We are interested in your plans for work and retirement when you are in 
your 60’s and beyond. Which of the following statements best describes your 
plans? 
1.  I will not be working full time at age 60 or later. 
2.  I will be working full time at age 60 or later, but I will completely 
stop working sometime after age 60. 
3.  I will be working full time at age 60 or later, but I will stop working 
full time sometime after age 60 and will likely continue working part 
time.  




If respondent chooses (2) or (3) 
1a. At what age do you expect to stop working full time? 
_______ AGE  (refer to this age as tR*) 
 
 
If respondent chooses (1), then 
1b. You indicated that you do not plan to be working full time at 
age 60 or later. At what age do you expect to stop working full 
time? 
_______ AGE  (refer to this age as tR*) 
   or 








  If respondent answers “yes,” then skip the remainder of the section 
 
 
3. Using any number from one to five, where one equals totally inadequate and 
five equals very satisfactory, how would you rate the retirement income you 
expect to receive from Social Security and any job-related retirement plans, 
such as 401(k) plans and all other types of pensions?   
 
1.  totally inadequate 
2. 
3.  enough to maintain living standards 
4. 




4. What do you think is the percent chance (what are the chances out of 100) 
that you will receive Social Security benefits at some time in the future? 
 
If respondent answers “0 percent,” then skip the remainder of the 
section 
 
5. If you were to receive Social Security benefits at some time in the 
future, do you expect to get them based on your own work record only; from a  
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current, previous or late spouse’s work record only; or from both? 
1. Your own record only  
5. Spouse’s record only  
3. Both records  
 
 
The fills in questions 6-8 depend on response to question 1: 
 
6. [Suppose you never work full time. / Suppose you stop working full time at 
age tR*. / Suppose you work full time for as long as you can, throughout your 
60’s and beyond.] At what age would you expect to start collecting these 
Social Security benefits? 
_______ (30-96) AGE (refer to this age as tC*) 
 
 
7. Suppose you [never work full time and/ stop working full time at age tR* 
and/ work full time for as long as you can, throughout your 60’s and beyond, 
and] start collecting Social Security benefits at age tC*. About how much 
would you expect the monthly payments to be in today’s dollars? 
$________ per month 
 
 
8. Suppose as before, [that you never work full time, but / that you stop 
working full time at age tR*, but/ that you work full time for as long as you 
can, throughout your 60’s and beyond, but] you were to wait to start 
collecting Social Security benefits until age tC*+1. About how much would you 
expect the monthly payments to be in today’s dollars? 
$________ (amount) per month 
 
 
9. Suppose you were to start collecting Social Security benefits at about age 
tC* or tC*+1, what do you think is the percent chance that your benefits would 
keep up with inflation for the remainder of your lifetime? That is, what do 
you think is the percent chance that your Social Security benefits would 




10. Suppose you were to start collecting Social Security benefits at about 
age tC* or tC*+1, what do you think is the percent chance that your benefits 
would be cut substantially at some point after you start collecting them? 
 
 
Hypothetical Choice Social Security Questions 
Phrase fills determined by response to question 1. 
Dollar amount, b, determined by response to question 9 
If question9 <1500, then b=1200 
If 1500<= question9 <2100, then b=1800 
If question9 >=2100, then b=2400 
 
 
Next we have a series of questions in which we describe an important decision 
that you may face in the future. Please read the instructions carefully so 
that the choices are clear to you and answer the questions as best you can. 
 
H1a. Suppose you [never work full time/ stop working full time at age tR* / 
work full time for as long as you can, throughout your 60’s and beyond], and 
you have not yet begun to collect Social Security benefits as you are about  
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to turn age tC*. 
 
Suppose you must choose between starting to collect your benefits when you 
turn age tC* or when you turn age tC* +1. 
 
If you choose to start to collect benefits at age tC*, then you will receive 
$b per month, and this amount will be guaranteed to increase annually based 
on a “cost-of-living adjustment” in order to keep up with inflation for the 
remainder of your lifetime. 
 
If instead you choose to wait one year to start collecting benefits at age 
tC*+1, then you will be guaranteed to receive an additional $(1/12)b each 
month [—that is, an extra $(1/12)b 12 each year—] in today’s dollars. This 
amount will be increased annually based on a “cost-of-living adjustment” in 
order to keep up with inflation for the remainder of your lifetime. 
 
 
RANDONLY ASSIGNED VARIANTS IN THE PRESENTATION (each respondent gets same 
variant in all subsequent questions) 
 
Treatment 1: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+12, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). 
 
Treatment 2: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 12 years. 
    
Treatment 3: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+12, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/12)b 12 
per year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
Treatment 4: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 12 years. Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/12)b 
12 per year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
 
What do you think is the percent chance that you would choose to wait one 
year to start collecting benefits at age tC*+1? 
 




H1b. Suppose now that if you choose to wait one year to start collecting 
benefits at age tC*+1, then you will be guaranteed to receive an additional 
$(1/8)b each month [—that is, an extra $(1/8)b  12  each year—] in today’s 
dollars. This amount will be increased annually based on a “cost-of-living 
adjustment” in order to keep up with inflation for the remainder of your 
lifetime. 
 
Treatment 1: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+8, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). 
 
Treatment 2: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits  
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(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 8 years. 
    
Treatment 3: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+8, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/8)b 12 per 
year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
Treatment 4: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 8 years. Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/8)b 
12 per year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
 
What do you think is the percent chance that you would choose to wait one 
year to start collecting benefits at age tC*+1? 
 




H1c. Suppose now that if you choose to wait one year to start collecting 
benefits at age tC*+1, then you will be guaranteed to receive an additional 
$(1/6)b each month [—that is, an extra $(1/6)b  12  each year—] in today’s 
dollars. This amount will be increased annually based on a “cost-of-living 
adjustment” in order to keep up with inflation for the remainder of your 
lifetime. 
 
Treatment 1: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+6, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). 
 
Treatment 2: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 6 years. 
    
Treatment 3: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+6, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/6)b 12 per 
year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
Treatment 4: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 6 years. Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (1/6)b 
12 per year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
What do you think is the percent chance that you would choose to wait one 
year to start collecting benefits at age tC*+1? 
 




H1d. Suppose now that if you choose to wait one year to start collecting 
benefits at age tC*+1, then you will be guaranteed to receive an additional 
$(5/24)b each month [—that is, an extra $(5/24)b  12  each year—] in today’s 
dollars. This amount will be increased annually based on a “cost-of-living 




Treatment 1: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+5, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). 
 
Treatment 2: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 5 years. 
    
Treatment 3: If you expect to live beyond age tC*+5, then it would be to your 
advantage to delay your retirement (Note: interest is not included in this 
calculation). Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (5/24)b 12 
per year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
Treatment 4: By choosing to wait, you would give up one year of benefits 
(that is, b 12 dollars) while you are age tC*, but you would make up that 
amount in 5 years. Moreover, you would continue to receive the extra (5/24)b 
12 per year in the event that you live for many years after that. 
 
What do you think is the percent chance that you would choose to wait one 
year to start collecting benefits at age tC*+1? 
 
 Variable n mean median std dev min max
Age (years) 299 47.6 50 9.09 18 59
Gender (=1 if female) 299 0.38
Currently married or living with partner (=1 if yes) 299 0.69
Never married (=1 if yes) 299 0.16
Highest Educational Attainment
High School or Less (=1 if yes) 299 0.16
Some College 299 0.34
Bachelor's Degree or More  299 0.50
Currently Employed (=1 if yes) 299 0.81
DB pension on current job (=1 if yes) 299 0.28
DC pension on current job (=1 if yes) 299 0.44
Percent chance of living to age 70 299 79.91 85 18.66 20 100
Percent chance of living to age 80 299 66.76 70 23.72 5 100
Time Preference: Today vs. 1 Year From Now
(dollar value at which delays payment)






does not delay 299 0.37
Time Preference: 10 vs. 11 Years From Now
(dollar value at which delays payment)






does not delay 299 0.31
Retirement Plans
no full-time work at 60 or later (=1 if yes) 299 0.26
completely stop working after 60 299 0.14
likely change to part-time after 60 299 0.28
full-time work "as long as I can" 299 0.31
Expected retirement age (years) 179 61.95 63 6.16 30 75
Percent chance ever receive Social Security benefits 299 70.57 80 28.12 1 100
Source of Social Security Benefits
own record (=1 if yes) 299 0.64
spouse's record 299 0.03
both record 299 0.33
Expected claiming age (years) 298 66.3 65 3.76 55 95
Expected monthly benefits at claiming age ($) 295 1263 1200 726 50 4238
Expected monthly benefits if delay one year ($) 290 1342 1200 786 0 4500
Percent chance benefits keep up with inflation 296 29.8 25 26.29 0 100
Percent chance benefits cut substantially 296 44.8 50 28.02 0 100
Delayed Claiming Scenarios
percent chance with return of 1/12 298 57.9 60 32.70 0 100
percent chance with return of 1/8 272 69.1 75 26.60 0 100
percent chance with return of 1/6 271 75.4 80 24.57 0 100
percent chance with return of 5/24 270 79.3 90 24.63 0 100
Table 1: Descriptive StatisticsDelayed Claiming 
Scenario Sample n mean median std dev min max
Full Sample 298 57.9 60 32.7 0 100
Full -- Treatment 1 60 72.1 80 27.5 0 100
Full -- Treatment 2 77 41.9 50 35.1 0 100
Full -- Treatment 3 80 65.1 70 27.8 0 100
Full -- Treatment 4 81 55.4 50 32.0 0 100
Expect No Full-Time Work After 62,  Benefits Based On Own Record 70 47.9 50 34.9 0 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 1 9 63.8 65 41.1 0 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 2 18 30.3 10 36.2 0 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 3 15 53.9 50 29.2 10 99
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 4 28 49.5 50 32.0 0 100
Full Sample 272 69.1 75 26.6 0 100
Full -- Treatment 1 57 79.9 80 19.7 10 100
Full -- Treatment 2 64 55.8 55 30.1 0 100
Full -- Treatment 3 78 70.9 75 24.6 2 100
Full -- Treatment 4 73 70.3 75 25.7 5 100
Expect No Full-Time Work After 62,  Benefits Based On Own Record 61 61.0 70 32.3 5 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 1 7 87.0 99 19.0 50 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 2 12 41.3 35 36.4 5 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 3 15 63.9 75 27.3 10 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 4 27 61.4 70 31.6 5 100
Full Sample 271 75.4 80 24.6 0 100
Full -- Treatment 1 57 84.8 90 18.9 10 100
Full -- Treatment 2 63 64.3 65 27.2 5 100
Full -- Treatment 3 78 74.9 80 25.5 0 100
Full -- Treatment 4 73 78.3 80 21.7 5 100
Expect No Full-Time Work After 62,  Benefits Based On Own Record 61 69.5 75 29.7 5 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 1 7 85.7 100 21.5 50 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 2 12 47.5 50 33.7 5 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 3 15 70.6 75 28.8 10 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 4 27 74.6 80 26.0 5 100
Full Sample 270 79.3 90 24.6 0 100
Full -- Treatment 1 57 86.9 99 21.5 10 100
Full -- Treatment 2 63 70.5 75 26.4 1 100
Full -- Treatment 3 77 75.5 90 25.8 0 100
Full -- Treatment 4 73 81.9 90 21.9 5 100
Expect No Full-Time Work After 62,  Benefits Based On Own Record 61 75.5 90 28.3 1 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 1 7 88.6 100 20.4 50 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 2 12 53.4 50 33.7 1 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 3 15 78.6 99 25.7 25 100
No Full-Time  After 62, Own Record -- Treatment 4 27 80.2 90 25.0 5 100
Percent Chance 
With Return Of 
5/24
Table 2: Percent Chance of Delayed Claiming
Percent Chance 
With Return Of 
1/12
Percent Chance 
With Return Of 1/8
Percent Chance 
With Return Of 1/6n mean median mode min max tC*=max{tR*, 62} tC*>max{tR*, 62}
<60 69 34.5 65 62 55 72 36.2% 59.4%
 60 or 61 13 63.8 65 65 60 67 23.1% 69.2%
62 32 63.0 62 62 62 69 71.9% 28.1%
63 or 64 8 65.3 64 63, 67 63 68 50.0% 50.0%
65 44 66.0 65 65 65 70 63.6% 36.4%
66 or 67 19 66.4 66 67 65 67 89.5% 0.0%
68-70 17 68.8 70 70 62 73 64.7% 11.8%
>70 or Never 96 68.9 70 70 62 95 1.0% 0.0%
Table 3: Retirement and Claiming Age Expectations
Age At Which Respondent Expects to Start Collecting Social Security Benefits (tC*) Age At Which Respondent Expects to Have 




Percent Chance of 
Delayed Claiming 
Predictor Variable with Return r1=1/12 1[tC*>max(tR*,62)] with Return r1=1/12
Age -0.167 -0.012 -0.230
(0.240) (0.004) (0.301)
Currently Married -2.775 0.006 -1.184
(4.358) (0.091) (6.022)
Currently Employed -5.482 -0.070 -9.443
(6.137) (0.109) (7.366)
DB pension on current job -1.379 -0.019 0.011
(4.073) (0.085) (5.951)
DC pension on current job -6.152 -0.130 -0.240
(4.261) (0.088) (6.398)
 Female -2.553 -0.095 -8.708
(4.339) (0.085) (5.987)
Some College -3.818 0.025 0.285
(2.852) (0.118) (7.783)
Bachelor's Degree or More  -2.852 0.027 -2.546
(2.682) (0.125) (7.570)










Plans to completely stop working after 60 1.971 -0.286 3.700
(8.330) (0.115) (8.890)
Likely to change to part-time after 60 10.373 -0.033 14.082
(6.334) (0.114) (6.803)
Will work full time for "as long as I can" 12.511 (dropped) (dropped)
(7.620)
Expected retirement age is less than or equal to 62 -2.820 -0.205 -5.195
(6.027) (0.100) (6.931)
 Expected source of benefits is own record 0.534 0.065 -1.532
(4.251) (0.087) (6.056)




Percent chance benefits keep up with inflation 0.086 -0.002 0.164
(0.075) (0.001) (0.093)
Percent chance benefits cut substantially 0.135 -0.002 0.207
(0.077) (0.001) (0.098)
Information treatment 2 -30.898 0.002 -29.462
(5.735) (0.106) (8.389)
Information treatment 3 -8.009 0.068 -11.219
(5.086) (0.112) (7.912)
Information treatment 4 -19.804 0.072 -22.729
(5.663) (0.105) (8.039)
constant 54.726 1.205 53.056
(14.215) (0.282) (17.948)
R
2 0.236 0.241 0.250
N 289 185 185
(those with tR*<70) (those with tR*<70)
Standard error estimates are calculated using STATA software (robust regression option) and are reported in parentheses
Require higher return for delayed payment 1 year from 
now relative to 10 years hence
Expected change in benefits if delay one year (fraction)
Outcome Variable  
Table 4: Best Linear Predictors of Delayed Claiming Expectations
Requires at least 0%-5% return to delay payment to 11 
years from now
Requires at least 10%-15% return to delay payment to 
11 years from now
Requires at least 20%-25% return to delay payment to 
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